United States Department of Defense photograph of an F-8 Crusader intercepting a Tu-95 'Bear-B' over USS Oriskany, dated May 25, 1974 [Wikipedia]Last weekend I read in a national defense column that the most important reconnaissance asset of the Sri Lanka Air Force, a Beechcraft aircraft [probably carrying a HISAR system] had come under attack by our own Navy who erroneously identified it as an LTTE aircraft while it was on a routine patrol off Trincomalee. The same scenario of the guy who dropped from the tree and got attacked by a bull as well. As usual however, for the luck of AF and Navy both, the aircraft wasn’t hit. What this event shows is the lack of command, control and communication coordination between the security forces of Sri Lanka. No point buying $20 million jets [I hear the same amount was spent to send Mahinda administration (mob) to watch finals at West Indies, dunno whether Rs or $s] if you can’t effectively guide them to their targets. Either they’d get shot down [mind you, we didn’t know LTTE had night bombing capability till they bombed us and we still don’t know what sorta A-to-A capability they have] or will shoot at someone else. This is a very real threat.
Imagine the Navy patrol mentioned above had some serious anti-aircraft capability? What would’ve happened? The SLAF would be deaf and blind by now, if they can be more so. The real threat is, having sophisticated weaponry, and shooting down an airliner on finals to Bandaranaike International by mistaking it for a Tiger aircraft. This was, and is, a very real threat and I was really relieved when they decided to close down the place at night. Already at least one commercial aircraft has come under fire already, suspected as a fleeing LTTE aircraft. Luckily it was way out of range, but again, anyway we shot at it.
This is the scenario of placing weapons, not systems. What we need is not something that shoots, but does it effectively. For that, we need to field a weapons system, and man it with guys who are at the bottom of a command chain on top of which would be the executive president. What we need is a National Military Command Center kinda thing. I guess the Joint Operations HQs can play the role, but it doesn’t seem implemented by the way things are going on.
In a real life scenario, this command center would be the nerve center of defense command in the country, with direct access to Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense and finally, the President. It would have at least one back-up. This command center would have weapons officers and interception directors directly in contact with all ‘live’ defense patrols in sea and in the air. The weapons officers would be able to positively confirm a target acquisition by a Kfir pilot or a Dvora gunner [for instance], and then authorize interception and weapons release. They would be in contact with especially the commercial air traffic control at Bandaranaike International and Colombo Airport, and commercial naval movement at maritime traffic control center in order to avoid confusion with commercial movements. The command center would be the upper point of reconnaissance data input by reconnaissance radars, patrols and watchpoints in the sea and on battlefront. This way they would be able to trace a threat’s movement in minutes, and authorize an already moving patrol to intercept, or to scramble an alert mission at any time of the day. The command center would have a general officer commanding, to whom weapons directors would be able to look up in a crucial situation. He, in turn, would have direct secure access to high level defense staff at the Defense Ministry and in turn, to the president. If a MiG-29, say, has to carry out a night radar-guided attack against an LTTE aircraft, the target would have to be acquired, designated and identified to be friend or foe in surgical precision. Else our inexperienced pilots [or the heartless former Soviet mercenaries] would sure down a commercial jet. This would be a tragedy and a crime, with irrevocable consequences.
This is the vital requirement of proper Command, Control and Communications coordination as we go towards increasingly complex weapons. If someone says it would be a useless spend, or don’t have cash to do that, then it would be better not to buy complex weapons. First we need a proper coordination of command and proper communications. If we had something like this, the incident I mentioned at the top of the post would never have happened.
Better drop two of the Fulcrums to buy support systems alone. That would pay up, and would help to get the best out of those two without getting stuck in more shit.
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